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Introduction 
The twentieth century witnessed a dramatic rise in the number of newly created states, 
especially big changes are noticeable after WWII as the number of states almost quadrupled 
(Coggins, 2011a: 27-28). The United Nations officially had 51 members by 1945 when it was 
created; at the moment there are 193 official members (United Nations, 2014a). Coggins 
(2011a: 28) demonstrated that secession was the most common cause of state creation, 
Pavkovic (2008: 1) supported her idea by claiming that secession became the principal way of 
gaining independent statehood. Despite that, not all the ‘attempted secessions’ are so 
successful: some of the entities that claim to be independent states are not recognized 
internationally. Without the international recognition these states cannot keep diplomatic and 
economic relations, join international organisations or sign international treaties (Fabry, 2010: 
7).   
There are a number of entities such as Abkhazia, Taiwan, Somaliland, East 
Timor, to name a few, that are all secessionist de facto independent states which are able to 
fulfil formal criteria of statehood. Despite that, they are treated differently by the international 
community, and external recognition was only granted for East Timor; meanwhile, others 
remain unrecognized and cannot fully exercise their sovereignty (Caspersen, 2012; Caspersen 
and Stanfield, 2011). As long as the pattern behind the selective recognition of new states is 
unclear and while ongoing secessionist conflicts persist around the world, it is important to 
assess the factors regarding international recognition. This thesis aims to answer the following 
research question: what are the main factors behind the external recognition of newly created 
states? In other words, why are some secessionist states externally recognized while others are 
not?  
7 
 
Different theories stemming from the disciplines of political science, 
international law, philosophy and ethics provide answers to this question. It is argued here 
that the question of state acknowledgement can only be answered by combining these various 
theoretical approaches. As such, hypothesis in this thesis are derived from a few different 
competing theories. It is argued here that there is not one specific factor that leads to external 
recognition; rather, there is a set of factors that together explain selective recognition of 
secessionist states. In order to answer the research question and to define this set of factors 
qualitative comparative analysis is used in this work. More precisely, the crisp set that is 
analysed using fs/QCA 2.5 programme. 
1. Literature review 
Although states are considered to be the main actors of the international system, and 
secessionism has become the main avenue for the creation of states, this process has gained 
much more interest in academia outside political science. It is a widely discussed topic among 
scholars of international law: the issues of right of self-determination (Radan, 2011; Cop and 
Eymirlioglu, 2005), secession in the framework of constitutionalism (Macedo and Buchanan, 
2003), border disputes in the case of secession (Johanson, 2011) and other questions are 
widely discussed. Legal and political philosophy is another discipline that examines various 
issues such as the legitimacy of secession and a peoples’ right to decide (Buchanan, 2003).  
Meanwhile, in the field of political science issues of secession are discussed 
relatively less. Most attention has been dedicated to those countries that managed to secede, 
and especially, to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and to the controversial case of Kosovo. Other cases, especially those that 
remained unrecognized have often been left out of most discussions. However, during the last 
few years the disputes over Kosovo and the recent secession of South Sudan have triggered 
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growing attention to the secession and creation of new states in the twenty-first century. 
Radan (2008; 2011) is one of these contemporary authors who concentrates on legality and 
explanations of secession. His definition of the term is used throughout this thesis. Secession, 
according to Radan (2008: 18-19), ‘is a creation of a new state upon territory previously 
forming part of an existing state.’ Consequently, the unfinished or unsuccessful attempt to 
create a new state is called the ‘attempted secession’. What is more, the term ‘secessionist 
state’ in this work is also employed to name a state that is not (yet) recognised by the 
international community, although it has proclaimed its de facto independence. The 
instruments and manner of the creation of a new state, whether it is a violent conflict, threat of 
force or a mutual agreement does not change the outcome, so these issues are outside the 
scope of this thesis.  
It was argued elsewhere (e.g. Peterson, 1997) that external recognition does not 
play any role in the creation of the state, and as long as this newly created state meets the 
requirements of statehood, it is a state. These requirements are set in the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933: permanent population, defined territory, effective governance and the 
capacity to enter into relations with other states (Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 
1933). However, as real world cases prove, unilateral secession is still a taboo in the 
international system—even if a secessionist state fulfils all the formal requirements (Fabry, 
2008: 52). This is why I both support a constitutive theory and assert that only external 
recognition of a state creates that state. As Fabry (2008: 51) put it, it is a ‘foreign 
acknowledgment that gives the community the standing of a sovereign state in international 
relations and law,’ and thus unrecognized states are not able to exercise their full sovereignty. 
In his article, Fabry (2008) showed that international recognition is essential for a secessionist 
state in order to exercise full sovereignty.  
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If an entity is not internationally recognized but fulfils all the formal statehood 
requirements, it can be called a de facto independent state, or as Caspersen (2011; 2012) 
called it, an ‘unrecognized state’. Caspersen examined all of the different aspects of 
unrecognized states: their status, origins, capabilities of state building, function within the 
international system, likely future trajectories, etc. Her definition of the unrecognized or de 
facto independent state is also used throughout this thesis. The state is called an 
‘unrecognized state’ when: 1) it has achieved de facto independence covering at least two-
thirds of the territory to which it lays claim, including the main city and the key regions; 2) its 
leaders are seeking to develop further state institutions; 3) the entity has existed at least for 2 
years; 4) the entity has not gained international recognition or has only been recognized by a 
patron state and few other states of less importance; 5) the entity has declared formal 
independence (Caspersen, 2012: 6, 11). 
Another author, Siroky (2011: 47), explained the reasons that lead to 
international recognition of secessionist states and asserted that different existing explanations 
can be grouped in three main categories according to the unit of analysis: 1) those that 
concentrate on the secessionist group, 2) the secessionist state and 3) external actors of 
foreign powers. Sometimes, scholars use mixed explanations that include factors from all of 
the above categories. Siroky (2011) argued that extremely impoverished or very distinctive 
ethnic groups; weak, poor, and ineffective mother states; political and economic support from 
external forces; and support of ethnically similar external forces are all factors that shape and 
influence secessionist movements and have an impact on their outcomes. Although Siroky’s 
work did not draw the exact causal links and did not present any concrete theory, it is useful 
as a review and grouping of existing theories. His findings are supported in this thesis, and in 
order to build an explanation of external recognition, factors from all three categories are 
incorporated. It is assumed that recognition is given only when these factors act together.     
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The first category, as mentioned above, stresses the importance of the 
secessionist group. Two different approaches are identified within this category. Some authors 
claimed that the general right to secession exists only when the group in question (secessionist 
group) has suffered injustices, while others claimed that group’s ethnic distinctness plays the 
most important role. The former idea was held by A. Buchanan, (1991; 2003) who asserted 
that a group can only secede and be recognized internationally when: 1) physical survival of 
its members is threatened by actions of the parent state (e.g. policy of the Iraqi government 
towards Kurds in Iraq) or 2) it suffers from violations of basic human rights (e.g. East 
Pakistanis who seceded to create Bangladesh), or 3) its previously sovereign territory was 
unjustly taken by the mother state (as with the Baltic Republics). Similar claims were 
supported by Dersso (2012: 231), who pointed out that external powers are more willing to 
recognize a secessionist group when it has suffered violations of human rights or systematic 
discrimination (it can be ethical, regional, economic, etc.). Moreover, Orentlicher (2003) in 
her study of democratic principles behind the external recognition also asserted that the 
international community should recognize unilateral rights to secede when a secessionist 
group has survived serious injustice and exclusion. Finally, Sterio (2013: 60-61) included 
injustice and violation of human rights as one of the four factors essential for external 
recognition. She claimed that the secessionist group must prove that it has been subject to 
oppression or has faced human rights’ violations; otherwise it cannot have international 
support. The first hypothesis summarized these considerations. 
 
Hypothesis 1: international recognition is more likely if the group in 
consideration (secessionist group) has suffered injustices or human rights’ violations. 
Another group of scholars that stresses the importance of the secessionist group 
claims that external recognition is more likely if the secessionist group is ethnically 
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distinctive from the majority or the ruling elite in a parent state. Heraclides (1991: 19) argued 
that if the secessionist group is ethnically (or otherwise culturally) different from a parent 
state, the role played by the group’s inequality or disadvantage becomes secondary. In other 
words, a group’s distinctness is the most important factor for the secession. The same view 
was held by Song (2003) who maintained that being a distinctive nation within the parent 
state gives people a right for self-determination, and this right should be supported by the 
international community. Casperson (2012: 54-55) added that an ethnically different 
secessionist group will receive even more international support if there are people of the same 
ethnicity living in another (for example, neighbouring) country. Accordingly, the second 
hypothesis stressed the significance of ethnical distinctiveness.  
 
Hypothesis 2: international recognition is more likely if the secessionist group 
is ethnically different from the majority or ruling elite in a patron state. 
The second category of authors derived their explanations from the state level. 
Many scholars who refer to the state level indicators stress various capabilities of secessionist 
states that help them gain international support. However, scholars differ in their opinion 
about the specific factors: Buchanan (1997), Orentlicher (2003), Sterio (2013) maintained that 
the newly created state must ensure that no (or less) human rights’ violations will appear; 
Caspersen (2012: 54-55) demonstrated that recognition is more likely when the secessionist 
state is economically stronger and receives some economic support from outside, but links 
with the supporting patron state are not too tight and do not make the secessionist country a 
puppet; Siroky (2011: 54-56) claimed that popular international support is gained if a new 
state is economically stronger and provides better services for its citizens. Finally, Sterio 
(2013: 60-62) asserted that recognition is more likely if the mother states are military, 
politically or structurally weaker as it makes them lose control of a secessionist region, and 
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the international community is more convinced to act in favour of recognition. All together 
these factors imply that the secessionist state offers better governance and quality of life to its 
citizens compared to what was provided by a parent state
1
.  
Hypothesis 3: international recognition is more likely if a secessionist state 
provides more effective governance and better quality of life for its people than the parent 
state. 
Finally, the third category concerns external factors. Coggins (2006; 2011; 
2011a) proved in her works that these factors are as important as the internal. She 
demonstrated that states within the international community (most importantly – the biggest 
and most important states) will act on their own political motives while deciding upon 
recognition. The main factors to look at are those that shape the power games between the 
Great Powers: their relation with the parent state, disorders in domestic politics, etc. The 
author’s main claim was that realist theories of international relations should be taken into 
consideration when explaining the support of the most important states of the international 
system. The same ideas were adopted by Sterio (2013), who concluded her book with the 
claim that rule of the Great Powers became the most important in theory of external self-
determination; therefore,  the motives of these countries should be studied carefully. 
Saideman (2011) also based his research on the assumption that support from the strongest 
players in the international community is essential for the success of secessionist movements. 
He concluded that power and parochial interest govern the foreign policies of the most 
powerful countries and their decisions towards states’ recognition. Additionally, Walker 
(1998: 36) argued that most states (including the Great Powers such as Russia and the US) are 
reluctant to recognize the new members of the international community because of the risk of 
                                                             
1
 It is suggested by scholars (e.g. Devers, et al., 2013: 11) to combine closely related conditions into one larger 
‘super condition’ so that a number of conditions in qualitative comparative analysis would not be too large 
(explained below in greater detail).  
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self-determination and separatism within their own borders. To sum up all these discussions, 
the hypothesis are based on Coggins’s (2006: 62-65) assumptions about the behaviour of the 
most powerful states and their external and domestic security considerations on the question 
of recognition. 
 
Hypothesis 4: international recognition is more likely if the Veto Powers
2
 are 
not beset by separatist challenges at home (by the time when a question of recognition is 
raised abroad). 
Hypothesis 5: international recognition is more likely if it weakens the enemies of the Veto 
Powers and does not weaken their friends. 
2. Time frame and selection of the cases 
The cases were chosen from the time period of 1992 to the present day because during the 
Cold war era secessionist countries had different possibilities and constraints that are not 
present today (mainly due to another form of secessionism – decolonization) (Caspersen, 
2012: 11). What is more, although dissolution is also a kind of secessionism, there are many 
different interpretations in both political science and international law about the cases of the 
Soviet Union, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, so these 
events were left out. Finally, due to the scope of the research it was too difficult to include 
more cases and extend the time frame. 
                                                             
2
 I use the term ‘Veto Powers’ instead of Coggins’s ‘Great Powers’ because the five countries I chose for my 
analysis are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and only they have a right to veto admission of 
newly created states. These countries are: The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France and China. 
Additionally, according to Coggins (2006: 96-97), they were the strongest and the most materially capable and 
influential players in the international system during the time period from 1992 to present, which makes them 
more interested in global issues such as secession and enables them to greatly influence decisions on 
international recognition.  
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All the cases that were included in the research were either states that managed 
to succeed and gain recognition after 1992 or that had existed as unrecognized states (the 
criteria of unrecognized states are mentioned above) until 2013 and had fulfilled the 
Montevideo criteria. These criteria helped to eliminate such entities as Western Sahara 
(Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) and Aceh movement because they did not control more 
than 70% of the clamed territory. Moreover, territories that maintained a very high level of 
independence but had not officially proclaimed their intentions of independence such as 
Puntland in Somalia or Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan were also excluded from the research 
(Caspersen: 2012: 8-11). 
Due to its limited length this research excluded ex-secessionist states that re-
seceded. That means the cases that in the time period of 1992 to the present day were 
unrecognized states, and because of some developments do not enjoy this status anymore. For 
example, Chechnya in 1996-2000 was claiming its independence from Russia, but after the 
war it was made to renounce these claims. Other cases of re-secession which were not 
included to the research: Bougainville (1975-1997) in Papua New Guinea, Republika Srpska 
(1992-1995) and Republika Srpska Krajina (1991-1995) in Croatia, Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka 
(1986-2009), Kurdish Autonomous Region in Iraq (1991-2004) (Caspersen, 2012:12).  
The cases of Taiwan and Kosovo were treated as unrecognized states, because 
they were not members of the UN and they were not recognized by some of the most 
powerful countries in the international system (Caspersen, 2012: 10).  
All the states that were created by secession after 1992 were part of the research, 
with an exception of Montenegro as its secession in 2006 might be understood as the 
continuation of a dissolution process of the former Yugoslav republic. Montenegro’s 
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secession was very unproblematic—supported by a mother state and based on the precedents 
of the other countries that seceded in 1992 (Sterio, 2013: 49-50).  
It means there are three secessionist countries that gained recognition in the time 
period from 1992 to the present day: East Timor, South Sudan and Eritrea. Eight 
unrecognized or de facto independent countries were also examined: Abkhazia, Nagorno 
Karabakh, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Transnistria (also called Transdniestria), the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, Kosovo and Taiwan (Caspersen 2012: 12; Caspersen and 
Stansfield, 2011: 185; Pavković and Radanan, 2007: 257-259). Table 1 shows all of the 
selected cases as well as the mother state from which they seceded or attempted to secede and 
the dates of either independence or of the announced but unrecognized independence.
3
 
                                                             
3
 All three recognized states were admitted to the UN (denoting recognition) in the same year as they proclaimed 
their independence. 
Table 1: Research cases 
Case  Mother state Year of recognition or attempted secession 
East Timor  Indonesia 2002 
South Sudan  Sudan 2011 
Eritrea  Ethiopia 1993 
Abkhazia  Georgia 1992 
Nagorno Karabakh  Azerbaijan 1994 
Somaliland  Somalia 1991 
South Ossetia  Georgia 1992 
Transnistria  Moldova 1991-1992 
Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus 
 
 
Cyprus 1974 
Kosovo  Serbia 1999 
Taiwan  China 1971 
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3. Research design 
The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is a research design that makes this project 
unique because it is a middle ground between case-oriented (qualitative) and variable-oriented 
(quantitative) approaches.  The goal of this strategy is to combine the best features of both 
approaches (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 223). The method was developed by Charles Ragin for a 
comparative case study research with the small- and moderate-N datasets (for those research 
studies ranging from 5-10 and from 50-80 cases) (Delreux and Hesters, 2010: 4). It is said to 
be among the most widely inﬂuential and most innovative strategies in social science 
methodology (Thiem and Dusa, 2013: 87; Breiger, 2009: 243).  
The method is based on the logic of Boolean algebra (see more: Ragin, 1987) 
and is carried out by special computer programmes. Using this method one has ﬁrst to 
produce a data table, wherein each case is displayed as a combination of conditions (with 
dichotomous variables that have values of 0 or 1
4
) and an outcome (also having a value of 0 
or 1). Afterwards a truth table is produced (mostly by using computer programmes), and it 
reconstructs data as a list of conﬁgurations5. Every such conﬁguration might correspond to a 
few observed cases (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 224). Next, a Boolean expression can be 
constructed, which is a long formula consisting of configurations described in a truth table. 
Finally, Boolean minimization, a procedure that reduces long Boolean expressions to their 
shortest possible expression (also called minimal formula)
6
 and is the main procedure of 
comparative qualitative analysis, is performed. This minimal list of prime implicants unveils 
                                                             
4
 Dichotomous values are only used for cs/QCA (as applied in this research); for a fuzzy set QCA various values 
between 0 and 1 are possible, meanwhile values of mv/QCA can be 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. 
5
 ‘A conﬁguration is a given combination of some conditions and an outcome’ (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 224). 
6
 Computer programmes allow researchers to find these minimal formulas by analysing empirically unobserved 
but logically possible cases. 
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the regularities in the data and  allows researchers to make generalizations and interpret this 
minimal formula, possibly in terms of causality (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 225). 
One of the advantages of the QCA method is, that being a middle way between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches, QCA consolidates contradicting goals of both 
strategies. As a qualitative method, it requires a thorough knowledge of the cases therein 
(needed in order to complete a data table, resolve possible contradictions, interpret the final 
solution
7
), and thus allows researcher to gather in-depth insight and capture the complexity of 
cases (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 223; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 6). As a quantitative approach, 
it allows researchers to analyze more cases than other case-orientated methods, thus enabling 
researchers to produce generalizations. Additionally, as put by Rihoux and Lobe (2009: 224), 
‘the Boolean algorithms allow the minimal formulas that are parsimonious, i.e. that can be 
expressed with the fewest possible conditions within the whole set of conditions that are 
considered in the analysis‘.  
What is more, the idea that each cause has its own single, independent impact on 
the outcome is rejected in the QCA; it is instead replaced by the assumption that several 
causes can be present simultaneously (a combination of factors thus lead to an outcome), that 
is so-called ‘conjunctural causation’ (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 8-9). As it is argued in this 
work that external recognition might be caused by a set of distinct conditions, this is an 
appropriate method whereby one might assess these conditions.  
Another big advantage of the QCA is that it allows researchers to assess and 
identify different combinations of causal conditions that are capable of generating the same 
outcome. It means that not only several factors in one configuration may lead to an outcome, 
but that even different configurations of factors can lead to the same outcome (Sehring, 
                                                             
7
 On the other hand, the results are drawn from the specific calculations and not directly from the case studies; 
that is why a less detailed analysis of the cases is allowed (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 6). 
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Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 2). Using Boolean algebra, QCA can evaluate 
multiple conjectural causation, i.e. different paths (that is, different sets of conditions) that 
lead to the same outcome (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 8-9). Additionally, the method enables 
researchers to observe those situations wherein a given condition is combined with other 
conditions that may sometimes act in favour of the outcome, and sometimes, when differently 
combined, that act against it (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 8-9; Delreux and Hesters, 2010: 4-6). 
In other words, the certain (or given) factor, depending on its configuration with other factors, 
can have either a positive or negative effect on the outcome (Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and 
Brockhaus, 2013: 2). Using other methods such factors would be considered as irrelevant; 
meanwhile, with QCA one assumes that causality also depends on its underlying configuration 
(Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 2-3). 
Finally, this method is ideal to analyse this study’s breadth of cases, as eleven 
cases is too broad for an in-depth case analysis whereas it is also too limited for the 
quantitative analysis. Qualifying case numbers for this method could be between 5 and 50, but 
the ideal number is from 8-10 or 20-30 (Norkus ir Morkevičius, 2011: 48-52). It is as well ‘a 
particularly powerful tool for theory testing’ (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009: 225) that helps test this 
study’s hypothesis and its main assumption that recognition of secessionist states is 
determined by both internal and external explanatory factors. As a middle way, this method 
allows to examine more independent variables than a simple qualitative analysis, however, 
less than a statistical research. General rule is to keep a balance between a number of cases 
and a number of conditions. Ideally, it should be 3-4 cases for each condition, but the 
common practice mostly ranges between four and six conditions (Rihoux et al., 2013: 178; 
Devers, et al., 2013: 10). 
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Crisp set QCA analysis was chosen instead of fuzzy set QCA because the 
hypothesis did not require an assessment of the level or degree of the conditions. Instead, the 
presence or absence of the described hypothetical conditions is important (that is, differences 
in kind matter more than differences in grade), so the cs/QCA was a more appropriate choice 
in this case (Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 19). What is more, 
dichotomization means some degree of simplification which allows researcher to reduce the 
complexity, that is, to explain difficult social phenomenon in a less complicated and less 
complex manner (Yamasaki, De Meur and Rihoux, 2009: 148-149). Although this choice 
resulted in the loss of some information (while coding information to dichotomous variables), 
this ‘loss’ is compensated by the in-depth knowledge that the researcher gains while 
examining the cases and which is later used when interpreting results and resolving 
contradictions. Finally, cs/QCA allows a greater degree of generalization and produces more 
parsimonious results than does fs/QCA. 
 Computer programme fs/QCA 2.5 was used in the research to analyze data and 
to conduct other procedures of the crisp set analysis. Additionally, all the operations were 
carried for the second time using TOSMANA 1.2.3.0 in order to verify if the same results 
were obtained with both programmes and to confirm the robustness of obtained findings. The 
same results were obtained in all cases, thus the identical tables are not displayed in this 
thesis. Both programmes use the same logic and the same procedures for the data analysis, 
fs/QCA 2.5 was chosen because it also allows examine the consistency and coverage 
(explained in further details bellow).  
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4. Operationalization and discussion of variables 
4. 1. External recognition 
The dependent variable—external recognition—was measured by a membership in the UN. 
Although membership does not mean that all of the UN member states recognize the 
secessionist country, it does allow the newly created country to enjoy all of the privileges of 
sovereignty on the international stage. What is more, it means that more than two-thirds of 
UN members have supported the independence of the newly created state (United Nations, 
2014b). Pavković and Radan (2007: 36) argued that admission to the UN qualifies a 
secessionist state as recognised and independent and called it ‘the ultimate form of 
recognition of independence.’ Information on the history of recognition was provided in an 
official website of the UN (United Nations, 2014c). If the secessionist state was recognized 
and admitted to the UN it got a positive value 1, if not – it got 0. 
4.2. Violations of human rights and injustice 
As for the independent variables, the first one concerned human rights violations and injustice 
(either violation of human rights or injustice had to be present). Injustice was understood as 
the existence of discriminatory or repressive policies towards the secessionist group. 
Qualitative data of the Minorities at Risk (2014a) reports were analysed in order to identify if 
there were any violations of the rights or unjust policies towards the secessionist group
8
; 
additional secondary sources were also taken into consideration. For recognised states, 
injustice in the year of independence and a time period of 10 years
9
 before the secession was 
analysed, whereas for attempted secessions – 10 years before the announced secession and the 
                                                             
8
 No information was given on the East Timor case, the secondary literature sources were analysed instead. 
9
 The period of 10 years was chosen because policies or violations do not happen in one day and are carried 
out/developed throughout some time. 
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time period until 2014 when it was existing as an unrecognized state. If there were violations 
of human rights or unjust policies during this time, the value for this variable was 1, if not – 0. 
Eritrea, South Sudan, East Timor and Kosovo were the only places where 
injustice or strong violations of human rights occurred. As for Eritrea, after WWII it was 
incorporated into federation with Ethiopia and enjoyed strong autonomy. However, in 1962 
the new Emperor imposed a strong centralised rule and abrogated all rights of autonomy for 
Ethiopia. The Tigrayans, who are the majority in current Eritrean territories, lost their political 
rights and privileges (even the official Arabic and Tigrinya languages were replaced by 
Ahmaric), and Ethiopian leaders repressed the opposition (prohibition of Eritrean national 
symbols, imposition of the censorship) (Minorities at Risk, 2014b; Sturman, 2011: 498; 
Giorgis, 2010: 6). Similar patterns of injustice were also found in Sudan where the South and 
North had been divided since colonization: the southern people were restricted from political 
participation and decision-making, Sharia law was imposed (although the majority of 
southerners were not Muslim). What is more, despite the fact that the South has always been 
less developed, the Sudanese government did not attempt to improve the quality of life in the 
underdeveloped South (Minorities at Risk, 2014c; de Kock, 2011: 505). East Timor, though, 
was a different case as Indonesian rule over the country was marked by violations of human 
rights such as ‘extreme violence and brutality of the armed forces,’ human massacre (it was 
estimated that 60,000 – 200,000 Timorese were killed), terrorizing civilians, and rape (Sterio, 
2013: 5-6; Salla, 1997: 161-162). Finally, Kosovars in Serbia suffered repression and 
discrimination in most of the spheres of life (lower standards of living, restrictions of voting, 
etc.), exclusion from political life, ethnic cleansing, displacement and resettlement of the 
population that led to international intervention (Minorities at Risk, 2014d). 
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Meanwhile, in the other cases of Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, 
Transnistria, Somaliland and Taiwan the secessionist regions have high levels of autonomy 
and are entitled to decide themselves upon the most important issues. No political, linguistic, 
religious or other injustice was reported (see: country profiles for the each case in Minorities 
at Risk, 2014a). The Turkish Cypriots do not have representation in the government, and most 
of them do not vote in the elections; however, it is their choice and mean of protest. 
Economically and culturally, they are also not discriminated and enjoy full autonomy 
(Minorities at Risk, 2014e). 
4.3. Ethnic differences 
The second independent variable is ethnic differences. In order to identify if the secessionist 
group was ethnically different from the rest of the population at the time of (attempted) 
secession information about the ethnic composition from the CIA World Factbook (2014) was 
used. The data was gathered for the year of proclamation of independence, in cases there this 
information was inaccessible the data from the closest census was used. In a few cases where 
the data about ethnicity was not provided, other official reports were used. If most of the 
population in secessionist territory was ethnically different from the majority of the 
population in a mother state the value 1 was given for this variable, if not – 0.   
Table 2 outlines the ethnic composition of the mother states and the secessionist 
states. Other major cultural differences that were stressed in a literature are also presented in a 
table to give the thorough overview of the cases. Notably, Somaliland is the only case there 
ethnical differences do not exist, although both Somaliland and Somalia are composed of 
different tribes/clans, they have common ancestral origins and all of them are ascribed to 
Somali people (Ssereo, 2003: 24-26).   
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Table 2: Ethnic differences 
Case 
 
 
Ethnic groups in a 
secessionist state 
Ethnic groups in a mother 
state 
Other major cultural 
differences (that cause 
problems or dissatisfaction 
between the mother state and 
the secessionist state) 
East Timor 
Austronesian (Malayo-
Polynesian); Papuan; 
small Chinese minority 
Javanese 40.1%; Sundanese 
15.5%; Malay 3.7%; Batak, 
Madures, Betawi, 
Minangkabau, Buginese, 
Bantenese 16.9%; other 23.7% 
Religious differences: most of the 
Indonesians are Muslim 
meanwhile most of the 
Timorese are Christ ian  
South Sudan 
Local tribes, black 
Africans: Dinka 35.8%; 
Nuer 15.6%; Shilluk; 
Bari; Kakwa; Kuku; 
Mandari; Ndogo; others 
Sudanese Arab  70%; other 
30% 
Religious differences: most of the 
Sudanese are Sunni Muslim 
while South Sudanese are animist 
or Christian 
Eritrea 
Tigrinya 55%; Tigre 
30%; Saho 4%; 
Kunama, Rashaida, 
Bilen (6%); other 5% 
Oromo 34.5%; Amhara 26.9%; 
Somali 6.2%; Tigray 6.1%; 
Sidama 4%; Gurage, Welaita 
4.8%; other 17.5% 
- 
Abkhazia 
Abkhaz 44.7%; 
Hemshin Armenian 
20.8%; 
Georgian 18,6%; 
Russian 10.9%; other 
5% (Human Rights 
Watch, 2011: 9-10) 
Georgian 83.8%; Azeri 6.5%; 
Armenian 5.7%; Russian 1.5%; 
other 2.5% 
- (N.B. Linguistic difference 
exist, but Abkhazian autonomy is 
granted a right to use Abkhaz as 
an official language) 
Nagorno 
Karabakh 
Armenian (  95%, 
according to the official 
figures of the local 
governance);   5% other 
(Office of the Nagorno 
Karabakh Republic, 
2005) 
Azerbaijani 91.6%; Lezgian 
2%; other 6.3% 
Religious (majority of Muslim in 
Azerbaijan and majority of 
Armenian Aspostolic Christian in 
Azerbaijan) and liguistic 
(Azerbaijani vs. Armenian) 
Somaliland 
Majority of Somali (no 
official census) 
Somali 85%, Bantu and other 
non-Somali 15% 
- 
South Ossetia 
Majority of Ossetians 
(no official census) 
Georgian 83.8%; Azeri 6.5%; 
Armenian 5.7%; Russian 1.5%; 
other 2.5% 
- 
Transnistria 
Moldovans 31.9%; 
Russians 30.4%; 
Ukrainians 28.8%; 
other 8.9% (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the 
Pridnestrovian 
Moldavian Republic, 
2004) 
Moldovan/Romanian 78.2%; 
Ukrainian 8.4%; Russian 5.8%; 
Gagauz 4.4%; other 3.2% 
Various disputes between the 
ethnic Slavs (Russians, 
Ukrainians) and Moldovans are 
salient; linguistic differences 
(Cyrillic vs. Latin alphabet for 
Moldovan language ) (Roper, 
2001: 106-107) 
Turkish 
Republic of 
Northern 
Cyprus 
Majority of Turkish 
Cypriots (no official 
census) 
Greek 77%; Turkish 18%; 
other 5% 
Religious differences: Turkish 
Cypriots are Muslim and Greek 
Cypriots are Christian 
Kosovo 
Albanians 92%; 
other 8% 
Serb 83.3%; Hungarian 
3.5%; Romany, Bosniak 
4.1%; other 5.7%; 
undeclared 3.4% 
Notable religious (Muslim vs. 
Christian) and linguistic 
differences (Alabian vs. Serbian) 
differences 
Taiwan 
Taiwanese 84%; 
mainland Chinese 
14%; indigenous 
2% 
 
Han Chinese 91.6%; 
Zhuang 1.3%; other 7.1% 
- 
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4.4. Effective governance and quality of life 
The third independent variable concerning effective governance and quality of life was 
measured by looking at the Freedom Index provided by the Freedom House (2014) because 
its calculation entailed both political rights and civil liberties. Political rights ratings in this 
index were based on the following subcategories: electoral process, political pluralism and 
participation, and functioning of government, while civil liberties ratings were based on 
freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and 
personal autonomy and individual rights. Additionally, various economic indicators (poverty 
headcount ratio, employment, GNI per capita) as well as different indicators of welfare 
(public spending on education and health, ratio of people obtaining primary education, ratio of 
population with access to drinking water source) were taken into consideration. Although all 
possible cases utilized data from the World Bank  (World Bank, 2014), there was no data for 
some unrecognized states. In such cases the information from various reports was considered 
(UNDP/World Bank, 2008; World Bank, 1997; International Crisis Group, 2010; Gunadvi 
and Kucukcifci, 2009; Bradbury, Abokor and Yusuf, 2003; Institute of Political Research, 
2009). In order to decide upon a value for this variable, the Freedom Indexes between the 
parent and the secessionist states were compared at the time of announced independence 
(when possible). Secondly, the indexes for unrecognized states were compared for all of the 
years that the secessionist state was not recognized (until 2014)
10
. Finally, other mentioned 
indicators were reviewed for the same time periods. If for more than half the time that the de 
facto independent state was unrecognized and was providing more effective governance and 
better quality of life than the patron state, the value for this variable was 1, if not – 0.  
                                                             
10
 For the recognized states only the year of announced independence was observed. 
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Only three cases demonstrated better Freedom House indexes than their mother 
states: Somaliland, Taiwan and South Sudan. In the same three cases other economic 
indicators also yielded better results when compared with their mother states. South Sudan, 
however, performed only slightly better than Sudan in most of the indicators,
11
 or even worse, 
when comparing access to the drinking water. However, its superior protection of civil 
liberties and fast development of education services and infrastructure led to the conclusion 
that it was performing slightly better and was also trying to provide the better quality of life to 
its citizens (Dagne, 2011). 
4.5. Separatist challenges within the borders of the Veto Powers 
As mentioned above (see: Literature review) the Veto Powers that were mentioned in 
hypothesis 4 and 5 are:  The United States, Russia, The United Kingdom, France and China. 
These five states are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and only they have a 
right to veto admission of newly created states.  
The fourth independent variable is the existence of separatist movements within 
the Veto Powers. In this work, the list of separatist movements in the world was used 
(provided by Coggins (2006: 367-374), and only those movements that were still active 
during the time frame of this research were considered. For the unrecognized countries I 
compared the length of a new country’s period of non-recognition with the existence of a 
separatist movement in at least one
12
 of the Veto Powers. If a separatist group afflicted the 
Veto Power member during more than half of the duration of the new country’s non-
recognition period, the value for this variable was 0. For instance, Kosovo announced its 
independence in 1999; from 1999 to the beginning of 2014 the years 1999, 2000 and 2008 
                                                             
11
 The notably better performance was only in the case of civil liberties. 
12
 I assumed that one is enough because each of the Veto Powers has a right to veto the recognition of a 
secessionist state if it is worried about potential challenges to their own security. 
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were marked by separatist challenges in one of the Veto Powers (explanation is given in the 
next paragraph), as it is less than half of the time, value for this case is 0. For recognized 
countries I assumed that the value for this variable was 0 if at least one of the Veto Powers 
had secessionist problems at the time when the recognition was given to the newly created 
state.  
Most of the Veto Powers (with an exception of the US) had problems with 
separatist groups at home, however the activity of these groups differed during the time, and 
most of them were only active for a short time. For this reason, the activity of these groups 
was also analysed, and it was assumed that the Veto Power had secessionist problems only 
when the civil war between the Veto Power and separatist groups was happening, or when the 
separatist group was permanently and actively fighting, organizing terror attacks, and/or 
rioting. Peaceful arrangements there the Veto Power recognizes separatist claims and is 
willing to negotiate it (such as Scotland in The UK) were not taken into consideration. In the 
case of Russia, Chechnya was the separatist group in civil war with Russia from 1994-1996 
and from 1999-2000; afterwards only sporadic attacks or bombings were organised in the 
region, and it was compelled to refuse independence claims (Caspersen, 2012: 12; Minorities 
at Risk, 2014f). The second Veto Power with the separatist challenge was France and its 
Corsican region in which 1996-1998 mark the peak years of rebellion activity. However, 
following the assassination of a high French official in 1998, only individual bombings—
rarely causing much damage or costing any lives—were registered (Minorities at Risk, 
2014g). The UK is the third Veto Power that was taken into consideration, and during the 
time period of 1992-1998 it was beset by violent riots and bombings in a region of Northern 
Ireland. The Good Friday accord was signed in 1998 to renounce violence, disarm and free 
the prisoners (Minorities at Risk, 2014h; Gregory, 2010). Finally, China has also faced 
challenges in its domestic policies as Tibet has been a source of disturbance for a long time. 
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Nonetheless, China has always managed to control Tibetan protesters, and only sporadic 
outbursts of violence were recorded there. Despite that relative peace, what were initially 
minor and peaceful protests escalated suddenly into spurts of violence before the Olympic 
Games, in 2008. These comprised the largest demonstrations and caused the greatest number 
of deaths thus far, therefore the year of 2008 was also included in the research (Dumbaugh, 
2008). As a result, the years of 1994-1996; 1999-2000; 1990-1998; 1996-1998 and 2008 were 
marked by daunting separatist activities in at least one of the Veto Powers. 
4.6. Relations between the Veto Powers and the mother state 
Finally, the last independent variable was the relation between the Veto Powers and the 
mother state. The list of militarized interstate conflicts (Correlatesofwar, 2014) was first 
analyzed, and it was assumed that if there were any military clashes between at least one of 
the Veto Powers and the parent state during the time of attempted secession
13
 the relations 
were not good, and the value given for this variable was 1. What is more, if there were serious 
diplomatic problems (such as a sudden rupture in diplomatic relations or a recall of all 
diplomats) between one of the Veto Powers and the mother state, the value 1 was also given 
to this variable. Information regarding diplomatic relations was attained from the websites of 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the embassies of respective states. 
The only military conflict throughout this time was between Georgia and Russia 
in 2008. Additionally, diplomatic relations between the two were announced as dissolved. 
The diplomatic problems appeared in two cases – between the UK and Sudan and between the 
US and Serbia. As for the UK-Sudan case, some British aid agencies and their staff members 
were expelled from Sudan due to the crisis in Darfur and amidst continuing pressure to 
                                                             
13
 For unrecognized states – the time period from proclamation of independence until 2014, for recognized – 
during the year of independence. 
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extradite the President of Sudan. The same issue of extradition also triggered diplomatic 
problems between the two countries, including the withdrawal of some British diplomats. 
Although the recall of the Serbian ambassador from the US and temporal evacuation of the 
American embassy also happened during this time, it was not considered as a crisis of 
diplomatic relations due to the fact that officials soon commented that this was due to 
domestic unrest in Serbia; they also stressed that there was no reversal of diplomatic relations 
(Woehrel, 2013: 9).  
5. Application of the qualitative comparative analysis 
As mentioned earlier, fs/QCA 2.5 was implemented to analyze the crisp-set and apply the 
rules of Boolean algebra that comprise the crisp set QCA. As it is recommended in a relevant 
literature (Hanley, 2011: 21), I carried out three analyses:  1) a first analysis that excluded 
unobserved cases and thus generated a complex QCA solution for [1] and [0] outcome, which 
means for recognition and non-recognition respectfully (e.g. what leads to recognition and 
non-recognition of secessionist states?); 2) the second analysis, which included not-
empirically-observed but logically-possible combinations, thus yielded the most parsimonious 
solution for the [1] and [0] outcomes; 3) the third analysis consisted of intermediate solutions 
for the [1] and [0] outcomes.  
As mentioned earlier, each condition (or independent variable) and the  resulting 
outcome (or dependent variable) were derived following careful examination of existing 
literature, and the rules for dichotomizing these conditions were established (see 
Operationalization and discussion of variables). Furthermore, in this study each condition and 
outcome will be shortened as following: 
 recognition (DV)  – external recognition of the secessionist state; 
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 injustice (IV; H1) – violations of human rights and/or injustice; 
 difference (IV; H2) – ethnic differences; 
 quality of life (IV; H3) – effective governance and quality of life; 
 challenges (IV; H4) – separatist challenges within the borders of the Veto Powers; 
 enemies (IV; H5) – relations between the Veto Powers and the mother state. 
The first step before carrying out the QCA was to make a dichotomized data 
table that would summarize all the information concerning the existence or absence of 
dependent and independent variables in all cases.  As mentioned previously, [1] was given if 
the condition was present in a particular case and [0] – if it was not.  
Table 3: Dichotomized data 
Case Name Recognition Injustice Difference 
Quality 
of Life 
Challenges Enemies 
East Timor 1 1 1 0 0 0 
South Sudan 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Eritrea 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Abkhazia 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Nagorno 
Karabakh 
0 0 1 0 1 0 
Somaliland 0 0 0 1 1 0 
South Ossetia 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Transnistria 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Turkish Republic 
of Northern 
Cyprus 
0 0 1 0 1 0 
Kosovo 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Taiwan 0 0 1 1 1 0 
 
In the next step the Truth table (Table 4) was created using the fs/QCA 2.5 
programme. This table represents the first ‘synthesis’ of the raw data table (Rihoux and De 
Meur, 2009: 44). It is understood simply as a table of configurations as it demonstrates the 
configurations of conditions associated with a particular outcome among the observed cases 
(Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 44-45). For example, in Table 4 one can see that the coexistence 
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of injustice, distinctness and challenges, together with the absence of quality of life and 
enemies are associated with a presence of recognition (this is a configuration in the third row). 
By looking at Table 4 one can also see that this configuration was observed in one of the 
cases – Eritrea.  In other words, this table matches the empirically observed combinations 
with their outcomes and the empirical cases representing these combinations. Using this 
‘synthesis’ eleven cases were transformed into seven configurations.  
This table also demonstrates that there are 2 cases exhibiting contradictory 
configurations (marked with a letter C in the table). According to Delreux and Hesters (2010: 
5), two cases cannot be logically defined by the same combination of conditions and must 
display a different outcome, which is called a contradiction. As one can see, East Timor and 
Kosovo are contradictions in this research study. In this case, typical strategies of removing or 
re-examining these conditions cannot be applied
14
 (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 48-49). 
According to one of the other options offered up by scholars (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 50) 
it is possible to proceed with an analysis and retain even the contradictory data in the table, 
which has been done in this study. However, this problem will be addressed again in the 
following section; in addition, its implications for the results and other possible strategies will 
be discussed.  
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 According to Rihoux and De Meur (2009: 49-50), there are a few typical strategies for resolving 
contradictions (however it was not possible to adopt these strategies in this research): 1) add extra conditions (the 
model would get too complex, while thenumber of cases would be a bit too low for 6 conditions); 2) replace one 
of the conditions (not valid for theory testing); 3) reconsider the definition of the outcome variable (the variable 
was well justified); 4) reconsider the cases (the cases were justified in existing academic literature, however this 
option will be further discussed in a subsuquent section); 5) recode contradictory cases as [0] on the outcome 
value (doesn’t make sense in a case of East Timor); 6) use frequency criteria (cannot be used with only 2 cases).  
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Following the Truth Table, the key operation of cs/QCA – the Boolean 
minimization – was carried out. fs/QCA 2.5 software was used to minimize the configurations 
and non-observed cases were not included in this first operation. The software utilized 
configurations from Table 4 in order to carry out Boolean minimization algorithms. The result 
is displayed in a Table 5 and the same result is described in a formula. The same solution was 
obtained using TOSMANA software. Conditions in capital letters show that a condition was 
present while the ones in minuscule letters reference the absence of a condition. 
Table 5: Boolean minimization formula for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION) 
Boolean minimization formula 
Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*QUALITY OF 
LIFE* 
*challenges*ENEMIES 
0.333333 0.333333 1.000000 
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*quality of life* 
*CHALLENGES*enemies 
0.333333 0.333333 1.000000 
Solution coverage: 0.666667 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
 
Table 4: Truth Table 
Injustice Difference 
Quality 
of life 
Challenges Enemies Recognition Case Name 
1 1 0 0 0 C East Timor, Kosovo 
1 1 1 0 1 1 South Sudan 
1 1 0 1 0 1 Eritrea 
0 1 0 1 1 0 
Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia 
0 1 0 1 0 0 
Nagorno Karabakh, 
Transnistria, Turkish 
Republic of Northern 
Cyprus 
0 0 1 1 0 0 Somaliland 
0 1 1 1 0 0 Taiwan 
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INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*QUALITY OF LIFE*challenges*ENEMIES + 
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*quality of life*CHALLENGES*enemies  RECOGNITION 
As one can see, this formula shows the same results that can be observed from 
empirical cases, which is why it is also called a ‘descriptive’ formula and  rarely proceeds 
beyond the observed cases (Rihoux and De Meur, 2009: 57). The formula consists of two 
terms, both of which result in RECOGNITION. These two terms represent two different paths 
that ultimately lead to recognition of secessionist states. Additionally, it is possible to 
manually modify this formula and produce a more structured version. The first part of this 
formula illustrates the necessary conditions, meanwhile the second part – INUS conditions 
(insufficient but necessary parts of a condition which is unnecessary but sufficient)
15
: 
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*{
                                 
                                  
  RECOGNITION 
The modified formula is not more parsimonious (as no conditions were 
eliminated), but it shows what is common between the recognised secessionist states: all of 
them suffered injustice or violations of human rights and their population was ethnically 
different from that of the mother state.  
 What is more, the second analysis was performed to see the opposite result: 
what leads to the non-recognition of the secessionist state. The following formulas and Table 
6 demonstrate the results that were obtained using fs/QCA 2.5 (the same results were obtained 
repeating the same procedures with TOSMANA software).    
 
                                                             
15
 This term will be explained in greater detail bellow. 
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Table 6: Boolean minimization formula for [0] outcome (non-recognition) 
Boolean minimization formula 
Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
injustice*DIFFERENCE*quality of 
life*CHALLENGES 
0.625000 0.625000 1.000000 
injustice*QUALITY OF 
LIFE*CHALLENGES*enemies 
0.250000 0.250000 1.000000 
Solution coverage: 0.875000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
 
injustice*DIFFERENCE*quality of life*CHALLENGES + injustice*QUALITY OF 
LIFE*CHALLENGES*enemies  recognition 
injustice*CHALLENGES*{
                          
                      
  recognition 
 In order to achieve more parsimony (i.e. less complex results) and find the 
shorter solution, the logical remainders (logically possible but non-observed cases) were also 
analysed: the programme automatically selected logical remainders that were useful to obtain 
a shorter minimal formula, added them to the set of observed cases and made simplifying 
assumptions about them. The result is demonstrated in Table 7, in which six simplifying 
assumptions were made  (essentially, the programme found six paths that should lead to 
recognition). What is more, the table shows the distribution of solution coverage (what 
percentage of cases each solution covers) and consistency (how consistent each solution is). 
Table 8 shows the same procedure and the simplifying assumptions for a [0] outcome, that is, 
for non-recognition. 
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Table 7: Minimization with logical remainders for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION) 
Solution (simplifying 
assumptions) 
Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
INJUSTICE*CHALLENGES 0.333333 0.333333 1.000000 
QUALITY OF LIFE*challenges 0.333333 0.000000 1.000000 
challenges*ENEMIES 0.333333 0.000000 1.000000 
INJUSTICE*QUALITY OF 
LIFE 0.333333 0.000000 1.000000 
INJUSTICE*ENEMIES 0.333333 0.000000 1.000000 
QUALITY OF 
LIFE*ENEMIES 0.333333 0.000000 1.000000 
Solution coverage: 0.666667 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
 
Table 8: Minimization with logical remainders for [0] outcome (non-recognition)  
Solution (simplifying 
assumptions) 
Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
injustice 0.875000 0.875000 1.000000 
 Solution coverage: 0.875000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000  
 
 There is, however, a zone ‘in between’ the most complex and the most 
parsimonious solutions. As mentioned earlier, the complex solution (or Boolean 
minimization) utilized only the empirically observed cases whereas the parsimonious solution 
incorporated any combination that provided a simpler solution (Ragin, 2008b). Yet for 
parsimonious solutions, decisions on logical remainders were made automatically and without 
regard to theoretical insights, therefore some simplifying assumptions might not make sense. 
This is why it is useful to also obtain the intermediate solutions that do not include logical 
remainders  which are inconsistent with the researcher's theoretical knowledge (said 
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researcher manually sets the circumstances under which a condition contributes to the 
outcome, meaning that the researcher decides if a condition should be absent or present for 
the outcome to occur) (Legewie, 2013). Intermediate solutions for [0] outcome and [1] 
outcome are demonstrated bellow in Table 9 and Table 10, respectfully. 
Table 9: Intermediate solutions for [1]outcome RECOGNITION 
Solution (simplifying assumption) 
Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
DIFFERENCE*INJUSTICE*challenges 0.333333 0.333333 1.000000 
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*QUALITY OF 
LIFE* 
*ENEMIES 
0.333333 0.333333 1.000000 
 Solution coverage: 0.666667 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
Formula: INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*{
          
                     
 = RECOGNITION 
 
Table 10: Intermediate solutions for [0] outcome (non-recognition) 
Solution (simplifying assumption) Raw coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
CHALLENGES*qualityoflife*injustice 0.625000 0.250000 1.000000 
enemies*injustice*CHALLENGES 0.625000 0.250000 1.000000 
 Solution coverage: 0.875000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
Formula: CHALLENGES*injustice*{
             
       
 
 
Before discussing the results, there are several more operations that must be 
carried out. First of all, for the assessment of each separate condition one should also check 
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the coverage and consistency of each. Consistency represents the extent to which a condition 
leads to an outcome (Elliott, 2013). Put simply, it demonstrates how well each condition 
explains the outcome and is often compared to statistical significance in qualitative research 
(Ragin, 2008a: 110-117). The particular condition is necessary (necessity is further explained 
below) only when its consistency value is 1 (Devers, et al., 2013: 34). Table 11 illustrates the 
consistency of each condition for the outcome RECOGNITION, and Table 12 demonstrates 
consistency for [0] outcome (non-recognition)
16
. It is also important to remember that, 
according to the QCA experts, the recommended consistency threshold is 0.75 (Ragin, 2009: 
121).  
 The tables also demonstrate another statistical measurement – coverage. 
According to Elliot (2013: 5), coverage illustrates how many cases within the observed 
outcome are represented by a particular causal condition. In other words, this measure shows 
the degree to which a condition explains the observed outcome. The bigger the coverage is the 
more empirical importance each condition has; this measure is similar to correlation in 
quantitative methods (Devers, et al., 2013: 35). What is more, very often the higher the 
coverage is, the lower the consistency becomes, because the condition or combination of 
conditions that covers many cases has less explanatory power for each  case. If there is a high 
consistency, but the coverage is low, the result is not compelling as it does not describe many 
cases. However, if there is a high degree of coverage and low consistency, such a result does 
not make a strong causal argument and is not worth any further consideration (Elliot, 2013: 
6). While assessing results there should thus always be a balance between consistency and 
coverage.  
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 Although theory does not suggest that reverse conditions would lead to a [0] outcome, it is interesting to 
examine whether some of them would have an impact on  non-recognition.  
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Table 11: Consistency and coverage of conditions for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION) 
Conditions tested Consistency Coverage 
INJUSTICE 1.000000 0.750000 
DIFFERENCE 1.000000 0.300000 
QUALITY OF LIFE 0.333333 0.333333 
challenges 0.666667 0.666667 
ENEMIES 0.333333 0.333333 
   
Table 12: Consistency and coverage of conditions for [0] outcome (non-recognition) 
Conditions tested Consistency Coverage 
injustice 0.875000 1.000000 
difference 0.125000 1.000000 
quality of life 0.750000 0.750000 
CHALLENGES 0.875000 0.875000 
enemies 0.750000 0.750000 
 
It should be noted that consistency and coverage do not apply only for the 
particular conditions, but they also hold the same importance for combinations of conditions 
(i.e. simplifying assumptions). Nevertheless, no additional analysis is required to assess 
combinations of conditions as this was done automatically for each calculation. In some of the 
tables one can notice ‘different kinds’ of coverage: raw coverage, unique coverage and 
solution coverage. De Meur and Rihouh (2009: 64) give a simple explanation of the 
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differences between these terms: if one thinks about the outcome RECOGNITION, raw 
coverage is the proportion of ‘recognized cases’ (that means cases with an outcome 
RECOGNITION) that are covered by a given combination of conditions (but the same cases 
can also be covered by other combinations); unique coverage shows the proportion of 
‘recognized cases’ that no other combination covers; solution coverage is the proportion of 
‘recognized cases’ that are covered by all the combinations given in a table. For instance, if 
one considers the combination QUALITY OF LIFE* the challenges in Table 7 (the second 
simplifying assumption in the table), then the raw coverage is 0.333333, which means that 
this combination pertains to 33.(33)% of cases in which the secessionist state was recognized. 
Meanwhile, unique coverage is 0.000000, and it shows that all of the cases exhibiting the final 
result of this combination can also be achieved by other combinations. The solution coverage 
0.666667 shows that all of the combinations given in Table 7 explain only 66.(66)% of all the 
cases in which recognition was given to secessionist states.  
Another term that should be explained here is the ‘necessary (combination of) 
conditions’. These are the (combination of) conditions that must be present for the desired 
outcome to occur; the outcome cannot happen without a necessary condition, and the absence 
of a necessary condition would always lead to the absence of an outcome (Sehring, Korhonen-
Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 3). Put simply, necessary conditions are always present when the 
outcome occurs. However, the presence of a necessary condition does not always imply the 
presence of an outcome because the necessary condition might have to be accompanied by yet 
another condition in order to cause an outcome. A particular condition has to be both 
necessary and sufficient
17
, meaning that it would always be observed in every case when the 
result occurs
18
 (Elliot, 2013: 25; Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and Brockhaus, 2013: 3). If one 
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 Following the same logic, sufficient (combination of) conditions are those that are present when a particular 
outcome is observed in some cases but that are not present in others (Elliot, 2013: iii)  
18
 Necessary and sufficient conditions almost never appear in a social reality. 
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condition is neither sufficient nor necessary by itself but is part of a configuration that has a 
causal effect on an outcome, it is called an INUS
19
 condition (Sehring, Korhonen-Kurki and 
Brockhaus, 2013: 3). Appendix 1 provides examples of these types of conditions.  
Additional analysis is needed for solving the contradictory configurations. As 
both Kosovo and East Timor had the same combinations of conditions that ultimately led to 
different outcomes, one has to return to the primary assumptions about these cases. Kosovo 
definitely raises more doubts than East Timor. Although it is not a member of the UN, it is 
already recognized by 107 states worldwide (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Kosovo, 2014). This study, however, assumes that it is not quantity of supporters but power 
that matters most in the international system; thus, recognition from such states as Tonga, 
Lesotho or Tuvalu is not as important as non-recognition from powerful states such as China 
or Russia. Additionally, there is still an ongoing debate about the status of Kosovo among 
legal and political science scholars (e.g. Vidmar, 2009). This is why an additional analysis 
was carried out (excluding the Kosovo case) in order to find new Boolean minimization 
formulas, parsimonious results, intermediate solutions for both [1] and [0] outcomes. The 
results are reflected in Appendix 2, and they are taken into consideration while discussing the 
research results.  
6. Discussion of the results 
In this section, each condition will first be discussed separately with attention paid to both 
research results and empirical findings. Afterwards, the combinations of conditions will be 
reviewed, answering the question of this research – what combination(s) of conditions lead to 
the recognition of secessionist states. Finally, some limitations and recommendations for 
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 INUS - insufficient (not sufficient by itself) but necessary components of causal combinations that are 
unnecessary (because of multiple paths) but are sufficient for the outcome (Ragin, 2008b). 
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future research will be introduced.  
6. 1. Violations of human rights and injustice 
The first hypothesis in this work stated that violations of human rights or unjust policies 
towards the secessionist group make recognition of a secessionist state more likely. This 
independent variable proved to be a necessary but insufficient condition (one can see it from 
the results of Boolean minimization formula and from the independent solutions with- and 
without the inclusion of Kosovo) which  led to recognition as it was present in all of the three 
recognized states (East Timor, South Sudan and Eritrea). To the contrary, it was missing in all 
of the unrecognized states with an exception of Kosovo. However, serious violations of 
human rights and unjust policies were employed against Kosovar people at the time of 
Milosevic’s rule; meanwhile, independence of this entity was announced almost ten years 
after his resignation. If independence instead of autonomy (with UN supervision) would have 
been announced by Kosovar people while repressions were still present or immediately after 
NATO intervention, recognition might have been possible much earlier than nearly ten years 
later, especially considering the fact that current Serbian authorities claim to be willing to 
ensure strong regional autonomy and equal rights for Kosovo Albanians (Vidmar, 2009). 
Despite that claim, Table 11 demonstrates that, while not even considering the case of Kosovo 
(total coverage 0.750000), this independent variable had a high importance on the outcome (it 
was both consistent and demonstrated a vast coverage). What is more, after excluding the 
Kosovo case, injustice not only thoroughly explained the recognition of secessionist states 
(consistency 1.000000) but also covered all the cases (Table 17). 
 In addition, the analysis shows that absence of injustice also leads to non-
recognition, although it is not sufficient but is a necessary part of this outcome (Table 10). 
This means that if there are no unjust policies or violations of human rights, the possibility 
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that a secessionist entity will remain unrecognized is considerably high. Absence of injustice 
is also the only parsimonious solution with- and without excluding Kosovo (Tables 8 and 15, 
respectfully) that leads to non-recognition. Although the results explain the [0] outcome very 
well (consistency 1.000000) (Table 12), one cannot claim that this generalized parsimonious 
solution can alone explain non-recognition of all secessionist states. First of all, in all of the 
empirically-observed unrecognized cases it was not sufficient (only necessary). Second, seven 
empirically-observed cases (excluding Kosovo) are not enough to deny the theories (discussed 
in literature review) that consider recognition to be comprised of a combination of factors 
instead of one particular condition. Third, if one considers cases that were excluded from this 
research such as re-seceded Chechnya, the existence of human rights violations did not lead to 
recognition.  
 To sum up, violations of human rights or unjust policies towards a secessionist 
group is a necessary condition that leads to the recognition of a secessionist state, and it has a 
strong explanatory power. Though it is not sufficient by itself and has to be present in concert 
with other conditions. The same can be said about the conditions that lead to non-recognition 
of a de facto state, as absence of injustice is an important factor for the international 
community to not recognize the state, although it is not by itself sufficient. 
6.2. Ethnic differences 
The second hypothesis of the research claimed that in order to get international recognition a 
secessionist group has to be ethnically different from the majority of the people in the parent 
state. However, the research results demonstrate that in most of the cases (with Somaliland as 
the only exception) the ethnic population of a secessionist group was NOTor? different from 
that of the mother state. There was no distinction between recognized and unrecognized 
secessionist states: ten out of eleven cases (nine out of ten if Kosovo is excluded) entailed 
42 
 
ethnically distinctive secessionist group. This means that this condition cannot explain the 
different outcomes among the cases even though the results show that ethnical difference is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for the recognition (in both Boolean minimization and 
intermediate solution, with and without Kosovo), and it also explains the outcome well 
(consistency 1.000000, see Tables 11 and 17). It is important to note that this condition covers 
only around 30% of cases (Tables 11 and 17) and is therefore too low for such a condition to 
be treated as important (Legewie, 2013).  
What is more, the absence of an ethnically different secessionist group has no 
importance for non-recognition of the state (very low consistency in Table 12 and Table 21). 
Because most of the unrecognized secessionist states also had an ethnically distinctive 
secessionist group, it may be concluded that ethnical difference is probably not a factor that 
leads to (non-)recognition but is instead the factor that encourages a secessionist group to 
secede from an ethnically different mother state.  
Finally, I carried out one more additional operation to identify results without 
this condition: Boolean minimization, intermediate solutions, parsimonious solutions and 
analysis of necessary conditions for [0] and [1] outcomes were performed. The absence of this 
condition did not have any influence on the final results as all factors remained the same, 
except in the intermediate solutions and Boolean minimization that obviously no longer 
contained DIFFERENCE. However, neither consistency nor coverage results changed. 
To conclude, research results show that the ethnic difference of a secessionist 
group was not an important factor. As mentioned in the literature review, both the unjust 
policies and ethnic differences conditions are backed by those scholars who claim that 
recognition first of all depends on the secessionist group. However, these scholars often note 
that their ideas contradict each other. The results of this research supports the claims of so-
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called ‘remedial right20’ scholars (Buchanan, 1997). 
6.3. Effective governance and quality of life 
The theory suggesting that those secessionist states that provide better governance and better 
quality of life to their citizens than does the mother state are more likely to be recognized. 
However, the consistency and coverage rates for this condition are very low (see Table 11), 
thus it does not have a strong explanatory power and is not  relevant for the final results. 
Empirical results also did not demonstrate any causal relationship: only South Sudan provided 
better life quality and better governance to its citizens than did its mother state, Sudan. 
However, both countries performed very similarly in most of these indicators. In addition, the 
cases of Taiwan and Somaliland (both unrecognized, but both performed better than the 
parent states) contradicted the theory. It is possible that operationalization of this variable was 
not correct and one should look instead at different indicators, but as long as there is no 
agreement among scholars who stress the importance of state-level factors, it is difficult to 
decide what exactly (economic factors, other indicators of the quality of life, services 
provided by the state, civil liberties, etc.) should be analysed.   
On the other hand, the absence of better governance and quality of life provided 
by the secessionist state might increase the chances of its non-recognition. According to the 
research results, it is an INUS condition for intermediate solutions (including and excluding 
the case of Kosovo), and its consistency and coverage – although not high – is sufficient 
enough to be treated as having some causal importance. It could be possible that this 
condition does not have an effect on the decision of the international community to recognize 
a secessionist state, but it could influence their choice not to (especially because it is neither 
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 Buhanan (1997) claims, that there are two types of scholars that stress the importance of the secessionist 
group: 1) ‘remedial right’ supporters (or those who claim that violations of human rights or unjust policies are 
the reasons that lead to successful secession) and ‘primary right’ supporters who believe that any ethnic or 
cultural differences mean that a group has a right to secede and should be recognized.   
44 
 
sufficient nor necessary, but is only an additional INUS condition). In such a case Taiwan and 
Somaliland would be treated as exceptions  to a general trend, but examination of more cases 
is required in order to make a good judgment. 
In conclusion, the findings of this research demonstrate that better governance 
and quality of life does not play a role in the recognition of secessionist states, yet its absence 
might influence other countries not to recognize a secessionist state. Nevertheless, further 
examination of this condition and additional cases are necessary in order to strengthen these 
findings. 
6.4. Separatist challenges within the borders of the Veto Powers 
Scholars who stressed the importance of external factors suggested that Veto Powers are more 
willing to recognize secessionist states if they are not beset by separatist challenges 
domestically. The research results demonstrate that recognition was granted to two out of 
three countries while there were no separatist challenges within the Veto Powers. The only 
contradictory case here was Eritrea. However, as Giorgis (2010) and Sturman (2011) 
suggested, the strongest powers lost their interest in Eritrea following the Cold War, thus it is 
possible that recognition was just a sign of ignorance: at the time it was considered a 
geopolitically unimportant place and was not treated as a salient precedent that would affect 
the domestic equilibrium of the Veto Power. Kosovo constitutes another case that opposes the 
theory, yet the contradictory nature of this case has already been discussed in previous 
sections. Although consistency of this condition was low (see Table 11 and Table 17 for the 
results with and without the case of Kosovo, respectfully), empirically it demonstrates a 
logical causal relationship, which suggests that perhaps more cases should be analysed before 
making a final judgement about this INUS condition. What is more, additional simulation of 
necessary conditions excluding the case of Eritrea brought the consistency score to 1.000000.  
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Moreover, the findings for [0] outcome produced even more favourable results. 
High consistency and coverage (see Tables 12 and 21), especially excluding the case of 
Kosovo, show that the presence of separatist challenges has actually contributed to the Veto 
Powers not recognizing secessionist states, and that it was even a necessary condition that led 
to non-recognition (Table 10).  
One more important observation should be made here:  despite often being beset 
by separatist challenges at home, Russia has been one of the few nations worldwide to 
recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
21
, while failing to recognize 
Kosovo. On the one hand, this fact implicates that there are other, more complex explanations 
influencing the behaviour of the Veto Powers. On the other hand, it does not mean that 
separatist challenges within one of the Veto Powers have no effect on that Power's decisions 
regarding recognition as it is known to be one of the necessary but not sufficient conditions. 
As already mentioned, examination of more cases is needed to provide stronger proofs for this 
condition. 
6.5. Relationship between the Veto Powers and the mother state  
The last condition is a relationship between the mother state and the Veto Powers, or more 
precisely, that recognition is more likely to be granted if it weakens the enemy of one of the 
Veto Powers, as was stated in the hypothesis. The empirical findings did not produce any 
justifications for this hypothesis: Sudan was the only mother state that had intense relations 
with one of the Veto Powers (the UK), meanwhile Indonesia (the parent state of East Timor) 
always maintained strong ties with the Great Powers, and the Veto Powers were almost 
indifferent to Ethiopia (mother state of Eritrea). On the other hand, relations among each of 
the Veto Powers and Serbia are good, but the European Powers and the US have recognized 
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 It also encourages Transnistria’s right of self-determination, however it has not officially supported its 
independence. 
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Kosovo whereas Russia and China are opposed to doing so. In addition, in the case of 
Moldova the previously healthy (albeit occasionally inconsistent and uncertain) relations with 
Russia began deteriorating precisely as a result of the conflict regarding Transnistria and its 
self-determination; therefore, it was actually the other way round. It was not the intense 
relations between Russia and Moldova that rallied Russia’s support of Transnistria (Chirila, 
2013), but it was the support given to this secessionist entity that influenced the relationship 
between the two countries. Finally, one more trend is to be noticed: as most of the  parent 
states are not powerful players in the international system they attempt to maintain good 
relations with the Veto Powers, and thus are willing to negotiate status of the secessionist 
entity (e.g. Indonesia recognized East Timor in order to keep good relations with the US, and  
Serbia has been negotiating Kosovo’s autonomy). 
Coverage and consistency for this condition are also extremely low and do not 
show any strong causal relationship between the condition and the outcome. Although it is an 
INUS condition among the intermediate solutions, statistical- as well as empirical results 
suggest that this is more of a sporadic coincidence than a causal relationship. On the other 
hand, the results suggest that if there are good relations between the mother state and the Veto 
Power, the latter is more likely to support the sovereignty of the parent state than the 
secessionist entity's right of self-determination. Consistency for a [0] outcome is high enough 
(see Tables 12 and 21) to assume that the absence of hostile relations is an INUS condition, 
which in combination with other conditions results in non-recognition. 
6.6. What leads to recognition? 
As one can see in Table 9, there are two intermediate solutions that lead to the recognition of 
a secessionist state. The first combination suggests that unjust policies or violations of human 
rights and ethnic differences, together with the absence of internal challenges within the Veto 
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Powers, must be present to recognize a secessionist state. Furthermore, the second 
combination suggests that in addition to the presence of injustice and ethnic differences, a 
better quality of life and intense relations between the mother state and one of the Veto 
Powers must be present. Although some of the discussed conditions might not wield a strong 
explanatory power in themselves, they carry more weight as a combination. However, each of 
these paths covers the unique and low percentage of the cases (as well as the whole solution). 
As mentioned earlier, the results with a very low coverage cannot lead to reliable conclusions. 
Nonetheless, the first combination is convincing as it could possibly explain the cases of both 
East Timor and South Sudan. Eritrea’s case would be an exception, but not an entirely deviant 
one, as it has possibly not been considered as an important precedent as yet, and the Veto 
Powers had doubted its influence on the developments of separatist challenges within their 
baorders. As for the second explanation, it could only explain developments in the case of 
South Sudan, in which both INUS condition are not proven by this research, rendering this 
combination an extreme outlier. There is also another intermediate solution that was obtained 
after solving the contradiction and excluding the case of Kosovo. This solution suggests that 
the combination of injustice and ethnic differences is the primary catalyst of recognition, yet 
as previously mentioned, ethnic difference does not exhibit signs of any empirical logic. 
Additionally, exclusion of this condition does not affect the results: the same combinations 
with the same coverage and consistency are produced without including ethnic differences.  
As a result, it stands that the combination of injustice and absence of separatist challenges is 
the most plausible explanation for the recognition of secessionist states, but further studies are 
necessary to prove these (see below). 
 As research results as well as empirical observations neither prove nor deny 
some of the conditions, it is difficult to make judgements concerning the parsimonious 
solutions. And again, the coverage of these solutions is too low to be considered a robust 
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result. The first solution (see Table 7), however, acts against the logic of theory, and at least 
within the frame of this research, it explains an exceptional case rather than a causal 
relationship; thus, one should not consider it at all. Other solutions demonstrate the need to 
examine more cases to enable the programme to make more reasonable assumptions about the 
logical remainders and perhaps achieve a higher coverage. Injustice, which is the only 
parsimonious solution after excluding Kosovo, is without a doubt a necessary part of the 
solution, but it cannot be called a sufficient one as it would otherwise also lead to the 
recognition of Kosovo, and there would be no need for exclusion. Results of the opposite 
analysis that scrutinized the combinations of conditions that lead to non-recognition 
demonstrate much higher coverage; thus, these combinations exhibit a much stronger causal 
relationship with the outcome. This strength can be explained by the fact that most of the 
examined cases appeared to be unrecognized states, which enabled the programme to make 
better generalizations. As displayed in Table 10 and Table 20, the secessionist state is not 
recognized when unjust policies towards the secessionist group are absent and when the Veto 
Powers are beset by separatist challenges within their own borders. In addition, recognition is 
not granted to those secessionist states who do not offer a better quality of life to their 
citizens, or when the Veto Powers have friendly relations with the parent state. The first path, 
though, is generated by making assumptions based on the cases of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia
22
, but if one keeps in mind the fact that Russia (the only Veto Power that had hostile 
relations with the parent state, Georgia) was the only one to recognize these secessionist 
entities, the cases might be interpreted as exhibiting characteristics attributed to the second 
path. The only parsimonious solution (Tables 8 and 19), or the absence of injustice, is again a 
necessary but insufficient condition (as it is insufficient to explain the case of Kosovo) and 
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 These cases are not covered by the second path as there were no friendly relations between Russia and 
Georgia, thus the programme made assumptions that another condition, the absence of better quality of life, must 
be the explanatory condition. 
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thus, such a generalization would not always lead to the expected outcome. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, this research revealed that unjust policies and/or violations of human rights by the 
mother state is a necessary condition that leads to the recognition of secessionist state. 
However, as it was assumed in the beginning of this thesis none of the conditions alone can 
explain the recognition: none of them are both necessary and sufficient, meaning that the 
combination of conditions is required to explain this complex phenomenon. This work has 
also demonstrated that the absence of the separatist challenges within the Veto Powers in a 
combination with injustice form the most plausible explanation for the recognition. 
Nevertheless, better quality of life and better governance in a secessionist state (than in its 
parent state) as well as hostile relations among the parent state and the Veto Powers might 
also act in a combination with unjust policies, yet the further analysis is required to make 
these findings more robust. As a result, only the second hypothesis can be rejected: ethnic 
difference between the mother state and the secessionist state appeared to be irrelevant for the 
external recognition. 
The main limitations of this research were related to the lack of cases: it was 
difficult to make profound evaluations concerning some of the conditions (especially the 
relation between the parent state and the Veto Powers, as well as the presence of the separatist 
challenges within the Veto Powers). The coverage of solutions was also affected by the lack 
of cases as it did not allow the programme to make robust assumptions about the logically-
possible but empirically-unobserved cases. However, the QCA methodology allows the 
addition of more cases to the research. Although it was not possible to do so within the scope 
of this thesis due to it its limited length, it is recommended to add secessionist entities that re-
seceded as well as to extend the time frame so that the case of dissolution of the Socialist 
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Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be added. This might also allow the researcher to 
create an extra condition if needed. 
 Concerning the chosen independent variables:  if the addition of more cases does 
not provide more robust results, the IVs quality of life and enemies might be re-examined. For 
the former, the researcher should turn back to the literature and choose the most suitable and 
convincing theory among scholars who stress the importance of the secessionist state-level 
factors for recognition. Choosing one particular theory instead of integrating the ideas of 
several scholars would help to operationalize this variable in a more precise manner and 
might produce better results. As for the IV enemies, each Veto State and its relations with the 
parent state could be analysed separately, or the analysis of the Veto Powers could be reduced 
to the analysis of the most important Great Powers in the international community. This 
would help to avoid an inaccuracy that occurred in some cases such as Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia where Russia was the only Veto Power that recognized these entities and the only one 
that had hostile relations with their parent states. Although this fact acts accordingly with a 
theory, statistically it was not possible to observe this logical relationship. In addition, the 
research also shows that there is a need to identify and examine new potential conditions and 
possibly include them into research. First, as it is demonstrated by the case of Eritrea, the 
CNN effect might be an important factor. The assumption was made in this work that the 
Veto Powers might have recognized Eritrea simply because they did not find it threatening to 
their domestic problems as the case was not widely escalated. In addition, escalation of the 
problem in a mass media might also trigger an attention of electorate which could influence 
the choices made by the politicians within the Veto Powers. Second, more attention could be 
given to the reasons that lie behind the behaviour of the Veto Powers, as in that they might 
have additional interest in the secessionist states, i.e. making them their own puppets (as 
Russia did with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria) or capitalizing on economic interests 
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(Taiwan is recognized by some microstates that are said to be paid for giving recognition), 
etc. Third, one might also examine the importance of a geographical proximity (would a 
secession of a small state far from the Veto Powers challenge them as much as secession in 
their neighbouring states? Or is it beneficial for the Veto Powers to recognise secessionist 
groups in neighbouring states in order to weaken them?). Finally, the power games between 
the Veto Powers might also be important: they might not give a recognition if that would be 
treated as an offensive act by another Veto Power (e.g. the Veto Powers do not recognize 
Taiwan as they want to maintain friendly relations with China).    
 At the end of a day, having confirmed only the first hypothesis (unjust policies 
and/or violations of human rights lead to the recognition of the secessionist state) and rejected 
the second one (ethnic differences do not have influence on the recognition), the other three 
remain for the consideration of a future research. An addition of some extra cases and 
possibly and inclusion of additional conditions are also essential for the further analysis.  
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Appendix 1. Types of conditions 
 
Table 13: Types of conditions 
Example Type of condition 
A  Z A is both necessary and sufficient condition. 
A*B  Z 
 
A and B are necessary (but not sufficient) conditions. 
A+B  Z 
 
A and B are sufficient (but not necessary) conditions. 
A*B + X*Y  
 
A, B, X, Y are INUS conditions. A*B and X*Y are sufficient (but not 
necessary) combinations of conditions. 
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Appendix 2. Research results excluding case of Kosovo 
 
 
Table 14: Boolean minimization formula for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION), excluding case of 
Kosovo 
Boolean minimization formula 
Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*qualityoflife*enemies 0.666667 0.666667 1.000000 
INJUSTICE*DIFFERENCE*QUALITYOFLIFE*challenges* 
*ENEMIES 
0.333333 0.333333 1.000000 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
 
Table 15: Minimization with logical remainders for [1] outcome (RECOGNITION), excluding 
case of Kosovo  
Solution (simplifying assumption) Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
INJUSTICE 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
 
Table 16: Intermediate solution for [1] oucome (RECOGNITION), excluding case of Kosovo  
Solution (simplifying 
assumption) 
Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
DIFFERENCE*INJUSTICE 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
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Table 17: Consistency and coverage of conditions for [1] outcome, excluding case of Kosovo 
Conditions tested Consistency Coverage 
INJUSTICE 1.000000 1.000000 
DIFFERENCE 1.000000 0.333333 
QUALITY OF LIFE 0.333333 0.333333 
challenges 0.666667 1.000000 
ENEMIES 0.333333 0.333333 
 
Table 18: Boolean minimization formula for [0] outcome (non-recognition), excluding case of 
Kosovo 
Boolean minimization formula 
Raw 
coverage 
Unique 
coverage 
Consistency 
injustice*DIFFERENCE*qualityoflife*CHALLENGES 0.714286 0.714286 1.000000 
injustice*QUALITYOFLIFE*CHALLENGES*enemies 0.285714 0.285714 1.000000 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
 
Table 19: Minimization with logical remainders for [0] outcome (non-recognition), excluding 
case of Kosovo  
Solution (simplifying assumption) Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
injustice 1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
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Table 20: Intermediate solutions for [0] outcome (non-recognition), excluding case of Kosovo 
Solution (simplifying assumption) Raw coverage Unique coverage Consistency 
CHALLENGES*qualityoflife*injustice 0.714286 0.285714 1.000000 
enemies*injustice*CHALLENGES 0.714286 0.285714 1.000000 
Solution coverage: 1.000000 
Solution consistency: 1.000000 
Formula: CHALLENGES*injustice*{
             
       
 
 
 
Table 21: Consistency and coverage of conditions for a [0] outcome (non-recognition), excluding 
case of Kosovo 
Conditions tested Consistency Coverage 
injustice 1.000000 1.000000 
difference 0.142857 1.000000 
quality of life 0.714286 0.714286 
CHALLENGES 1.000000 0.875000 
enemies 0.714286 0.714286 
 
